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LATIN AMERICAN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION
ANDREW S. MAURODIS*
ROBERT A. VIGODA
During the past few months, Latin American nations have taken a
number of initiatives in the direction of intraregional integration. With
much fanfare, the Andean Common Market (ANCOM) officially enacted
its ambitious Sectoral Program for the Automotive Industry, calling for an
investment program of $1.5 billion.' During this same period, plans were
also announced for the creation of a Latin American Export Bank
(BLADEX), whose main objective is encouragement of regional integration
and development.'
These and other less publicized advances which attest to the continued
viability of the concept of intraregional economic cooperation are tempered
by some unsettling occurances. The disintegration of a key Caribbean Com-
munity (CARICOM) program for the construction of aluminum smelters
by Trinidad-Tobago, Jamaica, and Guyana may threaten the future of that
regional organization. Similarly, Chile's final withdrawal from all ties with
ANCOM serves as a vivid reminder of the divisive forces that continue to
hamper efforts toward regional economic integration.'
The apparent ability of ANCOM to weather the disruptive effects of
the Chilean withdrawal, as evidenced by the ambitious strides taken in the
development of a regional automotive program, suggests organizational
strength that can withstand severe threats such as the partial erosion of its
structural framework. On the other hand, the failure of an industrial pro-
ject, a relatively smaller setback, poses a serious threat to CARICOM's in-
tegration efforts.
A casual observation focusing on the actions taken by each regional
body will fail to yield a satisfactory explanation of the bases for such actions
and their portents for the respective integration organizations. These
regional bodies are the products of cooperation among sovereign states. The
actions of each nation within the integration schemes are dictated in large
part by internal economic and political conditions. This colors every aspect
of organizational life, and must be understood in order to account for the
success or failure of a particular economic integration body.
*J.D. candidates, University of Miami School of Law
The authors wish to acknowledge with gratitude, the assistance of Maria de la Portilla in tran-
slating Spanish source materials.
1. Grupo Andino, October 1977, at 2.
2. Bus. Latin Am., August 17, 1977, at 262.
3. Grupo Andino. October 1977, at 2.
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Each nation is faced with unique economic problems. These problems
are transformed into demands as they are communicated through the
political process to the governing body. The efficacy of these demands will
vary given the importance of the particular economic sector concerned. The
national government must satisfy these demands to insure its political sur-
vival. Thus, a nation's willingness to cooperate in a regional economic
organization will depend upon the ability of the organization to aid that na-
tion in resolving its economic problems.
Conversely, the organization will have its own set of priorities flowing
from its role as the vehicle for adjusting the individual demands of its mem-
bers. This function requires the regional organizations to extract conces-
sions from each member. When such concessions conflict with internal de-
mands, the potential for strain is evident.
The manifestation of strains will depend in part upon the relative im-
portance of the particular member nations involved, in part on the nature of
the problem posed, and finally on the complexity of the problem solving
mechanisms.
The events of recent months can be viewed in light of this system of
competing goals. This survey will focus on the impact of recent economic
developments upon the various integration schemes. It will also review ac-
tions taken by Latin American countries, either unilaterally or in concert,
that effect the dynamic process of economic integration.
THE CARIBBEAN COMMUNITY (CARICOM)
On September 9, 1977, the member states of CARICOM agreed to con-
tinue existing prices on commodities traded under the current Agricultural
Marketing Protocol and Guaranteed Market Schemes.' At a recent
ministerial meeting of the Standing Committee Responsible for Education,
held on August 24, 1977, it was noted that satisfactory progress was being
made in the Program of Regional Cooperation in Education. In particular,
activities in adult education, the teaching of reading, the professional
development of senior school administrators, and curriculum development
were singled out for praise.'
CARICOM's Secretary General, Allister Mclntryre, recently resigned
his post so that he could take a high position in the United Nation's Con-
ference On Trade and Development (UNCTAD). One observer has com-
mented that Mr. McIntyre's resignation was due to his frustration over
delays by CARICOM governments in implementing its regional programs.6
In response, Mr. Mclntryre maintained that his resignation was based solely
4. Caribbean Community Secretariat Press Release, No. 3511977, September 9, 1977.
5. Caribbean Community Secretariat Press Release, No. 34/1977, August 24, 1977.
6. Bus. Latin Am., August 17, 1977, at 264.
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on personal considerations. 7 Although admitting impatience with the pace
of CARICOM's progress, the former Secretary General remains steadfastly
optimistic about the organization's future as the only viable alternative for
regional integration.8
However, CARICOM's organizational purpose has been frustrated by
the recent withdrawal of Trinidad-Tobago from a major industrial project.
The program, calling for the construction of two tripartite aluminum
smelters by Trinidad-Tobago, Jamaica, and Guyana, was beset by an in-
traregional dispute over the allocation of economic responsibility.9
Trinidad-Tobago expressed dissatisfaction with the quality of the contribu-
tions made by its partners, as well as suspicion about their ability to fulfill
their financial obligations. Trinidad-Tobago had contributed all of the
funds for the feasibility studies and related operation necessary for the in-
ception of the project. Guyana and Jamaica were handicapped by huge
balance of payments deficits, and the resulting slumping economies preven-
ted them from making similar contributions. The expression of concern by
Trinidad-Tobago prompted Guyana to pledge its support for the project on
the condition that Trinidad-Tobago give its assurance that it would fully
participate in the Guyanese phase.' 0
The breakdown of the aluminum smelting program indicates the man-
ner in which a conflict between national interests and organizational
priorities is often resolved. Success of the program was obviously in the best
interests of CARICOM, both as a boost to its image as a healthy working
mechanism and for the tangible economic benefits that would ensue. The
participating nations initially perceived the CARICOM venture as a vehicle
for the satisfaction of domestic economic demands for self-sufficiency in
aluminum smelting. However, Trinidad-Tobago came to believe that it
could no longer achieve a satisfactory resolution of its economic problems
through organizational activity, thereby thwarting the success of the entire
project.
Import policies have been another source of friction among
CARICOM nations. Trinidad-Tobago has decided to curb imports from
Jamaica and Guyana in retaliation against trade restrictions imposed by
those nations. Though this action by Trinidad-Tobago is permitted by the
CARICOM Treaty, it is feared that such a policy will cause adverse reac-
tions by other CARICOM members, thus severely weakening an organiza-
tion already beset by political and economic strife."
7. Georgetown Chronicle, August 14, 1977, at 6.
8. id.
9. Bus. Latin Am., August 17. 1977, at 264.
10. Id.
11. Id.
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Thus, the spirit of cooperation evidenced by the initial involvement of
the three countries in the aluminum smelting project was coextensive with
their belief that domestic economic demands would be met through such
cooperation. Accordingly, when domestic economic demands can be met
through organizational cooperation, CARICOM members willingly par-
ticipate in coordinated activity with their regional body. Despite the dif-
ferences between Trinidad-Tobago and Guyana over the aluminum
smelting program, it is believed that Trinidad-Tobago may be amenable to a
grant of $50 million in trade concessions to Guyana. 2 This credit would be
used to export rice and timber to Trinidad-Tobago.
THE LATIN AMERICAN FREE
TRADE ASSOCIATION (LAFTA)
LAFTA members implemented a new complementation agreement to
facilitate free trade.13 The recent accord between Mexico and Argentina
deals with tariffs on essential oils, chemical aromatic products, and
fragrances and flavors to be used in the manufacture of cosmetics and
toiletries. 4 Brazil, which had previously proposed a similar scheme, was in-
vited to join the pact. Under the agreement, tariffs will be reduced to ap-
proximately one half of present rates. Argentine duties, which average 33
percent, will be slashed to 17 percent. The Mexican tariff of 12 percent will
be cut to 5 percent for the products involved.
A number of preextisting complementation agreements have also been
extended. At a recent meeting of LAFTA members in Montevideo, Com-
plementation Agreement No. 15, covering pharmaceutical products, was ex-
panded for the fifth time since its inception in 1971. A proposal for the in-
corporation of eighteen new items into the accord was enthusiastically
adopted by the delegates. Among the items introduced are mercury bi-
iodide, nicotonic acid, dexamestasone phosphate, kanamicine base, and
kanamicine sulphate. Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico also proposed that
tariffs on thirty substances already covered by the pact be lowered even
further. I
In similar developments, the chemical sector recommended a one year
extension of tariff concessions on products included in the three com-
plementation agreements that originally granted concessions on a tem-
porary basis (nos. 16, 20, & 21). 16 The delegation also urged that additional
products be added to those included in existing agreements. Specifically,
12. Id.
13. In a complementation agreement, two or more member countries agree on preferential
tariff treatment for a specific group of products.
14. Bus. Latin Am., October 12, 1977, at 325.
15. Id.
16. Bus. Latin Am., August 31, 1977, at 279.
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signatories to the Petrochemical Agreement No. 16, which include Argen-
tina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and Venezuela, proposed that twenty-one new
items be incorporated into that accord with special tariff reductions for
each. Delegates from Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and Uruguay dis-
cussed the Surplus and Deficits Complementation Agreement for the
Chemical Industry (no. 21). They recommended that a total of sixty-six con-
cessions be extended to products already included in the list, but which have
not been accorded special treatment. Finally, the parties to the Dyes and
Pigments Agreement (no. 20), Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico, will
consider the proposals of their delegates to withdraw twenty-six concessions
and replace them with seventy-eight new ones.
Proposals for a complementation agreement covering tungsten-carbide
and stainless steel balls used in ballpoint pens, mechanical pencils, assem-
bled and non-assembled devices for mechanical pencils, nonmetallic points
for markers, fountain-pen nibs, and nib points have been forwarded by
private sector representatives from Argentina and Mexico." Under the
plan, these articles would be taxed at 8 percent of c.i.f. value when entering
Argentina, and 9 percent of c.i.f. value when imported into Mexico.
Plans have been formulated for a possible complementation agreement
in the textile sector, the first such agreement covering this particular group
of products. The list of national concession candidates will be determined in
consultation with the local chamber of commerce or business associations of
each country involved in the agreement. 8
In contrast to these .strides, negotiations concerning a proposed com-
plementation pact for the aluminum industry have stalled. The latest in a
series of sectoral talks held in March (1978) saw a task force, comprising
twenty delegates from Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, and Venezuela, again
fail to reach an agreement on the proposed accord. However, represen-
tatives agreed to recommend several national list concessions to their
governments. I I
Brazil recently adjusted its import regulations to exempt certain raw
materials from its prior deposit scheme. 0 At the same time, it altered its
trade regulations so as to allow the importation of up to $1,000 of machine
replacement parts without a license. The 100 percent prior deposit require-
ment had been applied to goods covered by LAFTA negotiated concessions.
In return for the exemption of LAFTA goods, participants in the recent sec-
toral meeting for dyes and pigments agreed to allow Brazil to impose a tem-
porary 15 percent ad valorem duty on the extempted products. The duty
17. Bus. Latin Am., September 14, 1977, at 284.
18. Bus. Latin Am., August 17, 1977, at 263.
19. Bus. Latin Am., October 12, 1977, at 325.
20. Bus. Latin Am., August 24, 1977, at 271.
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would revert to 2 percent ad valorem if Brazil fails to maintain its 100 per-
cent prior deposit scheme against third country imports.
Brazil's apparent gesture of cooperation with its LAFTA partners is
timed so as to extract maximum benefits, while minimizing disruptive effects
that threaten to cripple its ability to meet domestic economic demands. The
conciliatory action deflected foreign criticism which, if transformed into
reciprocal sanctions, would have threatened the Brazilian economy. This
tentative liberalization also came at a time when Brazil's trade performance
indicated vast improvements. Through July, there was a $347 million sur-
plus in foreign trade. This was reflected in a 36 percent gain in export
revenues, a 46 percent rise in commodities, and a 24 percent increase in
manufacturers over the first seven months of 1976.21
However, a change in any of these variables could have a negative im-
pact on Brazil's future willingness to cooperate with LAFTA. The most im-
portant of these variables, the condition of the Brazilian economy, is also
the one most likely to change.22 High coffee prices, which led to Brazil's out-
standing trade performance in the first half of 1977, will probably weaken as
production recovers from the 1975 frost. Furthermore, the cost of servicing
Brazil's debt, which now stands at $30 billion, is still rising. 23
In a bilateral action with another LAFTA member, Brazil manifested a
willingness to sacrifice a source of internal revenue in order to foster
regional trade. 24 On April 18, Argentina and Brazil extended an agreement
which prevents double taxation of income derived by international air and
sea carriers organized in each country. The agreement would exempt the
assets or gross receipts of such companies from all municipal and local
taxes.2 5
As a means of increasing the foreign exchange income deemed
necessary to continued integration, LAFTA has established a program
designed to promote exports from member states.26 Under this program,
zonal banks (consisting of LAFTA member countries) will act in advisory
capacities to export companies. Furthermore, they will seek extraregional
funds to finance exports and will cooperate in the creation of a zonal in-
stitute of advanced bank studies. 7
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Indications are that the current economic slowdown will continue through next year.
For a detailed review of Brazil's economic outlook, see Bus. Latin Am., November 16, 1977, at
362.
24. Novedades-Monthly Newsletter of Intern-American Tax Research Ltd., June 1977, at
44.
25. Id.
26. Comercio Exterior de Mexico, August 1977, at 314.
27. Id.
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Bolivia, pursuant to a committment made through LAFTA, issued a
list of Uruguayan products entitled to reduced import duties. The reduc-
tions apply to those products imported before March 18, 1980.21
THE CENTRAL AMERICAN COMMON MARKET (CACM)
The International Group for Agricultural Development in Latin
America (IGAD/LA) recently released statistics concerning the post-
harvest loss of basic grain production in Central America. 29 The IGAD/LA
noted that Central America loses between 15-30 percent of its production of
corn, beans, rice, and sorghum to attacks by rodents, insects, and mold. At
1975 prices, the loss is estimated at $100 million annually.30 This is ob-
viously a staggering blow to an economic sector of vital importance to
CACM members.
The IGAD/LA proposed a two pronged attack to deal with the
problem. First, national governments must develop a viable agricultural in-
frastructure, which would include programs in technical training, farm
storage construction and credit, surveys, pest management, and drying. At
the same time, the study recognized that Central American nations must
look to sources of technical and financial assistance emanating from outside
the region. A $20 million fund created this past spring by the United Na-
tion's food and Agriculture Organization represents such a source of exter-
nal assistance.3"
CACM recommended actions of its own to strengthen the agricultural
performance of its members. The proposed plan, entitled Regional
Cooperation and Exchange of Agricultural Products In Central America,
was developed in conjunction with the United States Agency For Inter-
national Development (AID). The program contains plans which call for
$5.8 million in preinvestment expenditures and a total outlay of $207.9
million for investment between 1977-82.32 Production schedules will be set
for four new crops believed to hold great promise as exports: african palm,
cacao, rubber, and coconut.
A basic element of the plan is the encouragement of intraregional trade.
Imports from third countries grew by 27 percent from 1964-74, while in-
traregional imports increased by only 7 percent during that same period.
The short term goals include crop diversification in small holdings,
stabilization of domestic grains, and education of growers in the area of
fluctuation in supply and demand.
28. Novedades-Monthly Newsletter of Inter-American Tax Research Ltd., June 1977, at
45, see arts. 1, 2, Supreme Decree No. 14430, March 18, t977,
29. IDB News, No. 7, September 1977, at Insert.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Bus. Latin Am., September 28, 1977, at 306.
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Implementation of these proposals would be a positive step towards the
development of the infrastructure deemed necessary for continued growth in
the agricultural sector. However, the present draft of the plan falls short on
specifics, leading one source to question the ability of CACM members to
marshal the political willpower necessary for full implementation.13 In-
evitably, the success of the plan will depend upon each nation's perception
of the economic benefits to be derived from cooperation with CACM, as in-
fluenced by their respective domestic economic and political conditions.
Unfortunately, the attempts to increase agricultural productivity in the
region come at a time when CACM members find themselves beset by
political uncertainty and a gloomy economic outlook.
Internal political instability in Nicaragua, caused by the ill health of
General Anastasio Somoza Debayle, President of Nicaragua, threatens to
involve that country in a border dispute with Costa Rica.34 The Sandanist
Liberation Front has exacerbated the present internal crisis in Nicaragua by
launching guerrilla attacks in the Costa Rican border area and in cities
within Nicaragua. This led Nicaragua to accuse Costa Rica of harboring
these leftist revolutionaries, and prompted at least one military clash bet-
ween the two CACM members.
Figures from the second half of 1977 indicate a continued steady
decline in coffee prices." This is of particular concern to CACM nations
who failed to take full advantage of the recent coffee boom through rein-
vestment of their profits. Further developments in this area will depend in
part on the success of the price stabilization agreement between Columbia
and Brazil.
Domestic political and economic problems have been accompanied by
disquieting organizational behavior. A tariff proposal, which would adopt
the Brussels Tariff Nomenclature (BTN) and adjust tariff levels according to
a scheme based on a more sophisticated measurement of economic effects,
has been temporarily shelved. Instead, CACM has agreed to renew the 1968
San Jose Protocol, which imposes a 30 percent import surcharge on many
consumer items. The apparent inability to abandon the San Jose Protocol
raises doubts as to CACM's committment to tariff reform
3 6
Nevertheless, trade among CACM members is continuing its steady
growth. Such trade is now approaching $1 billion a year. According to one
source, Central America remains attractive to relatively small international
33. Id.
34. Bus. Latin Am., November 2, 1977, at 350.
35. Latin America Special Report, August 1977, at 4.
36. See note 34 supra.
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ventures, producing high returns on investment year after year with only a
moderate degree of risk.37
ANDEAN PACT (ANCOM)
The withdrawal of Chile from the Andean Pact was finalized with its
formal resignation from the financial arm of the Pact, the Andean Develop-
ment Corporation (CAF).38 The movement which resulted in Chile's action
was believed to be spearheaded by Venezuela, the newest member of the
organization.39
In an unrelated development, the CAF announced plans to grant finan-
cial aid for the establishment of binational industries on the borders of
Colombia and Venezuela, Ecuador and Peru, and Peru and Bolivia.4"
The month of September saw the official enactment of the Sectorial
Program For The Automotive Industry, a program hailed as a major ac-
complishment in the process of Latin American integration." The fifth and
final version of the program places emphasis on co-assembly and co-
production of vehicles and calls for $1.5 billion in investment over the next
four years. 2
The agreement incorporates a number of new concepts including the
"assigned category" and the "basic model".43 Each participating nation will
be assigned a class of vehicle for whose production it will be responsible.
The vehicles will be classified according to the number of cylinders and
weight. Within each category, a nation must elect a basic model upon which
it will concentrate its efforts. Similar assignments will be made for compo-
nent parts.44 The program also permits bilateral agreements which will
enable each nation to participate in the production of most models. This
aspect of the plan was an important factor in satisfying Peru, which had ex-
pressed concern over the allocation of production of small and medium size
cars (of which it is the largest consumer). Under the plan, Peru may enter
into a co-assembly arrangement with Bolivia and Colombia for medium-
weight trucks in exchange for an allocation of two basic models in the
category of small and medium size cars .4 The continued success of the
program will depend in part on the ability of its organizers to appease those
countries that feel short-changed by the complex allocation process.
37. Id., at 352.
38. Andean Group, October 1977, at 2.
39. Bus. Latin Am., August 31, 1977, at 277.
40. El Comercio, June 15, 1977, at 14.
41. Grupo Andino, October 1977, at 2.
42. Bus, Latin Am., October 12, 1977, at 327.
43. Grupo Andino, October 1977, at 8.
44. Id., at 8.
45. Bus. Latin Am., September 7, 1977, at 286.
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Included in the agreement are intraregional tariff reductions for com-
ponents and finished vehicles. This will result in lower duties on goods
traded between Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela from 1979-1983. The tariff
scheme will culminate in 1983 with the introduction of duty-free trading
among those three nations. Bolivia and Ecuador would have duty free
access to these markets by 1981.46
The automotive program also sets standards covering the permissible
level of the "local content" of vehicles and components given preferred
treatment. The level has been set at 70 percent. This means that for a vehicle
to receive preferred treatment, the percentage of the finished product con-
structed outside the Pact must not exceed 30 percent. Such a requirement
will be a definite challenge to Pact nations in view of the fact that the present
local content of vehicles is no more than 35 percent. 7
Another of the controversial aspects of the accord is the Common
Outer Tariff (COT). The COT will be a unified tariff charged to all parts and
vehicles eminating from outside the subregion. The tariffs range between 40
percent to 50 percent for parts and components and 45 percent to 155 per-
cent for chassis and finished vehicles. Colombia has protested that the levels
are too high, while autoparts manufacturers in Venezuela have complained
that the 55 percent tariff on parts is too low. The present tariff on auto parts
in Venezuela is 80 percent.
4
The COT is a mixed blessing for Bolivia and Ecuador. High tariffs are
necessary to protect their exports to other Andean Pact nations. However,
these two countries have no automotive industry at this time and the high
tariffs may discourage interests wishing to establish manufacturing opera-
tions for fear the parts tariff might price vehicles produced in Bolivia and
Ecuador out of the market. 9
The inability of Latin American countries to provide sufficient
amounts of fertilizer to satisfy the demands of the agricultural sector has led
to an increasing reliance upon foreign sources. This has resulted in a drain
on international reserves and has caused the IDB to encourage self-
sufficiency in the fertilizer industry." In 1975, IDB specialists visited the
Andean subregion to assess the potential for improving the performance of
this sector. The interest generated by the IDB activity has apparently
spurred progress in ANCOM's fertilizer program. A successful ANCOM
fertilizer seminar has culminated in a plan which, if approved, would in-
crease output through the use of existing plants. Rather than allocating the
46. Bus. Latin Am., October 12, 1977, at 327.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. IDB News, September 1977, at 3.
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production of fertilizer on a country by country basis, production would be
boosted through the lowering of existing tariffs. Concomitant with this ac-
tion, pressure will be exerted on fertilizer factories to raise production levels
to capacity, to produce fertilizer suitable for crops grown in the region, and
to upgrade the bloc's transportation system."'
This approach to the problems of lagging production in an important
industry reflects a philosophy different from that evident in the automotive
industry. The fertilizer sector has chosen the route of tariff reductions as the
vehicle to increase productivity. This contrasts with the method of
allocating production in the capital and labor intensive industry involved in
the Sectorial Program For The Automotive Industry. The latter scheme is
far more complex; it contains more limitations upon action and requires
more concessions. At the same time, it provides the prospect for a political
and economic windfall.
Increasing complexity in integration schemes adds to the difficulty of
assessing the relative costs and benefits of participation. Each nation must
make a complex cost-benefit analysis of its peculiar situation before
deciding to embark on such an integration project. The success of the plan
requires that the independent analysis of every country yield the same result
- a decision to participate in the integration scheme. Dr. Enrique Iglesias,
Executive Secretary of the United Nation's Economic Commission for
Latin America (ECLA), has noted that:
".. . (as) long as integration schemes become more complex,
governments find it increasingly difficult to evaluate the cost of
their decisions and they may restrain or block the evolution of the
process."52
OTHER DEVELOPMENTS
Although the four major regional organizations are the most visible
manifestations of the economic integration movement, unilateral and mul-
tilateral actions occuring outside the context of these organizations exert a
significant influence on that movement.
Plans were announced for the establishment early in 1978 of a Latin
American Export Bank (BLADEX). The bank's main objectives will be to
encourage intraregional trade and promote nontraditional Latin American
exports by extending short and medium term credit. Short term credit will
be provided by rediscounting bank acceptances for up to one year. Medium-
term credit will be extended for capital goods and industrial machinery. The
bank hopes to begin operations with a fund of $100 million.5 3
51. Id.. at 3.
52. Latin Am. Free Trade Ass'n Newsletter, November-Dccember, 1976, at 7.
53. Bus. Latin Am., August 17, at 262.
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Construction has begun on the massive Itaipu hydroelectric complex
on the Parana River, the product of a joint venture between Brazil and
Paraguay.54 The project is expected to earn $100 million in revenue when
completed. Paraguay is planning a similar hydroelectric plant on the Parana
River at Corpus, to be built in conjunction with Argentina.55 The
geographical proximity of these projects has led Argentina to express its
concern that the huge Itaipu plant would effect the water level of the Parana
River to the detriment of the Corpus project. 6 Brazil has sought to assuage
these fears by offering its assistance in efforts to improve the technical and
economic conditions at the Corpus plant.5
In Brasilia, Ambassador Juan de la Piedra, Subsecretary for Economics
of the Peruvian Embassy, confirmed that Brazil might participate in the
development of the Peruvian nuclear program." The Ambassor also dis-
cussed a number of other cooperative ventures being considered. Among
these projects are the construction of a storage depot for Peruvian minerals
in Sa5 Paolo, a binational company to prospect for Peruvian copper, and
the bilateral exploration of possible Peruvian oil reserves. 9
These examples of extraorganizational cooperation are indicative of a
new trend towards what has been labelled the "intraregional joint ven-
ture." 60 The IDB estimates that there are in excess of 170 of these ventures
described as "a marriage of public or private capital of at least two Latin
American nations."'6' Seventy-five percent of these ventures are in the
manufacturing sector and 66 percent are owned by private Latin American
capital.
62
According to George McRobbie, Executive Director of the Inter-
mediate Technology Development Group, intraregional technical coopera-
tion of this nature is an improvement over traditional bilateral arrange-
ments whereby developed countries affected wholesale transfers of
technology to less developed nations. 61 Such a procedure was inefficient due
to the inability of the less developed state to adapt the technologies to its
social and economic needs. Collaborative efforts between nations which are
54. Id., at 257.
55. 0 Estado Sio Paulo, August 21, 1977, at 28.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. 0 Globo, July 13, 1977, at 3.
59. Id.
60. Bus. Latin Am., August 31, 1977, at 273. See Bus. Latin Am., November 30, 1977, at
383.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. 1DB News, May 1977, at 6.
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in the same developmental stage is often a more appropriate response to
common problems.6" The joint venture has the advantage of enabling Latin
American countries to exploit markets heavily protected by trade barriers,
while increasing both marketing know-how and the financial base of the
undertaking.
6
These joint ventures are not immune from the potential for conflict in-
herent in the larger organizational endeavors. The dispute between Brazil
and Argentina over the Itaipu and Corpus power plant projects illustrates
the manner in which a joint venture may adversely affect third countries.
The source of concern for Argentina in this instance is environmental in
nature. However, it is not difficult to imagine a situation in which the
economic ramifications of such exclusive cooperation between two coun-
tries are disadvantageous to a third party within the region. If a joint ven-
ture achieves its purpose of improving the positions of the participating par-
ties in relation to a certain economic goal, other nations within the region
will be placed at a competitive disadvantage. Thus, the very success of a
joint venture may be dysfunctional for Latin American economic integra-
tion goals as a whole.66
Brazil and Colombia, countries which account for 50 percent of the
world's annual coffee production, agreed to coordinate their marketing of
coffee in a bid to bolster world prices. 67 The acccord, entitled the Manaus
Agreement, is expected to strengthen coffee prices by eliminating the com-
petition which marked their previous sales policies. According to one
source, the agreement seems to assure other producing nations that their
prices will not be undercut in the world export market.68 This action by two
such influential producers may avert the softening of prices expected as a
result of recent surpluses in both countries.
69
The River Plate Basin will be the beneficiary of a special fund es-
tablished to aid the process of physical integration in the area. The par-
ticipating members will be Argentina, Bolivia, Uruguay, Paraguay and
Brazil.7" The authorized capital is $100 million, with $20 million to be con-
tributed initially. One of the first proposed projects is a railway link between
eastern and western Bolivia. This would constitute the final stage of an
Atlantic-Pacific railroad in South America. Another proposal would
64. Id.
65. Bus. Latin Am., August 31, 1977, at 273.
66. However, improved ecomonic conditions for the countries participating in the venture
may accrue to the benefit of the entire region by providing more economically sound trading
partners.
67. The Wall St. Journal, November 7, 1977, at 17.
68. Id.
69. Latin America Special Report, August 1977, at 4; see also Finance and Development,
No. 3, September 1977, pp. 28-31.
70. Bus. Latin Am., September, 1977, at 311.
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allocate funds for construction of a natural gas pipeline in Uruguay which
would be connected to an existing pipeline between Argentina and Peru.7
The success of recent negotiations for the opening of a branch of the
Bank of Brazil in Caracas, Venezuela is indicative of a warming trend in
economic and political relations between these two South American
powers. 2 According to sources in Brazil, the development is considered
vital to the Brazilian goal of expanded economic activity in Venezuela.
73
The implementation of policies by individual nations aimed at max-
imizing the success of domestic industries while curbing inflation, has led
several nations to take unilateral actions which will affect the quality of their
commitment to the free trade objectives of the various regional organiza-
tions.
Debate in Colombia over inflation brought the issue of import controls
to the forefront. Colombia has enjoyed a large trade surplus due in part to
the high level of coffee exports. 74 Former Finance Minister Rodrigo Botero
has publicly advocated the elimination of license requirements on many im-
ports and a general decrease in tariffs. Mr. Botero believes that such actions
would result in lower prices within Colombia by exposing local business to
some healthy competition from abroad.7" However, the present Finance
Minister, Abdon Espinosa Valderrama has dismissed his predecessor's
proposals, arguing that such policies have failed to control inflation in the
past. Mr. Valderrama remains committed to the maintenance of present
controls.1
6
On the other hand, the Mexican government has chosen to pursue a
middle course between the protectionist stance of Mr. Valderrama and the
free trade policy of Mr. Botero. By promulgating new rules governing the
acquisition of import and export permits, Mexico intends eventually to sub-
stitute an import tariff scheme for present license controls. Article Seven of
the revision would require action on licensing applications within fifteen
days of submission of the request, instead of the customary thirty to forty-
five day delay. Under article Seventeen, an importer may acquire a global
permit covering one year's import license requirements. Such a permit
would obviate the need for periodic license renewal. 7 The immediate effect
of these reforms will be to facilitate the process by which importers and ex-
porters obtain necessary licenses. Proponents of the new rules argue that
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this first step in the direction of a license-free trade policy will increase ef-
ficiency by introducing foreign competition into the domestic market while
at the same time, keeping check on inflation. It is important to note,
however, that since the granting of licenses remains in the Secretariat of
Commerce, the gains in trade liberalization may be reversed by governmen-
tal fiat.
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Argentina recently embarked on a campaign to place its automobile in-
dustry on a competitive footing with its foreign competitors. Acting on the
assumption that competition from abroad will reduce prices to consumers
and increase exports, the government is considering the possibility of easing
restrictions upon imports of finished vehicles. Such action would end a
twenty year policy of heavy tariff protection. Anticipating resistance from
its automotive industry, the Argentine government has offered local
manufacturers freedom from price controls. Such a concession would be
contingent upon the end of the present protectionist policy. Auto manufac-
turers are vehemently opposed to the liberalization of tariffs and have
labeled the government's proposal as "blackmail.""
Observers have focused upon the government's treatment of tariffs in
the auto industry as a barometer of trade policies concerning other sectors
of the economy. The lowering of tariffs for so influential an industry may
therefore be the harbinger of similar cuts in other areas. Conversely, if the
government succumbs to the pressures generated by its auto manufacturers,
the cause of protectionism would be advanced at the expense of free trade.8 0
GENERAL OUTLOOK
While the prospects for future economic integration in Latin America
are mixed, the general outlook for the region is relatively favorable. The
average growth in real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is expected to be in
excess of 5 percent for most Latin American nations.8 A notable exception
to this rapid growth is Mexico, where the predicted rate of growth in GDP is
only 1 percent. Mexico has been plagued by the ever-present problem of in-
flation which also afflicts Venezuela (whose inflation rate will likely surpass
1975's record high of 10.2 percent) and Paraguay (where inflation is expec-
ted to double). 2 Leading all Latin American nations is Argentina where the
cost of living rose an estimated 97 percent during the first nine months of
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1977. 81 However, a number of nations have exhibited an ability to cope suc-
cessfully with this vexatious problem. In Chile, where the rate of inflation
had been an incredible 107 percent in 1976, the increase in prices was held to
38.8 percent. Nicaragua, Bolivia, Honduras, and Costa Rica have managed
to successfully curtail inflation. 4
Rising foreign indebtedness, coupled with the questionable ability of
Latin American nations to meet debt service payments, has not stopped the
flow of credit from international banks.8 5 An excess liquidity resulting from
slack demand in the industrialized world has provided Latin American
countries with a fertile source of credit. Given such market conditions, len-
ders are free to consider intangibles such as political strength and unity as
well as the quality of economic administration.86 In this respect, success in
the integration process may cause lenders to be favorably disposed to the
granting of development loans.
Finally, an area of crucial concern which supersedes territorial boun-
daries is the task of developing sufficient energy resources to sustain
economic growth. The Secretary General of the Organization of American
States (OAS), Alejandro Orfila, has estimated that two-thirds of the nations
in the region suffer from substantial deficits in their energy supplies." The
OAS and the IDB have been the primary organs fostering regional coopera-
tion on this issue. However, progress in the area of energy conservation and
development will face serious obstacles. The energy resources and require-
ments of each Latin American nation are quite diverse, making a unified at-
tack upon the problem difficult. Further, much of the energy consumed in
Latin America goes to industrial production.88 Thus, any material reduction
in energy consumption may adversely affect the pace of economic develop-
ment. The choice between conservation and economic development will be
especially significant for the less developed nations in Latin America. In this
respect, the energy problem exemplifies the challenge facing Latin American
countries in their efforts to integrate. Success in meeting this challenge will
ultimately depend upon the ability of Latin American nations to satisfy in-
dividual needs within the context of unified group action.
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